Yves here. Below Andrew Korybko, among other issues, is talking up the prospect of a ceasefire and a frozen conflict. While Ukraine and the US may think that’s a viable endgame, this again is another instance of the dynamic we described in our May post, US Geopolitics: Believing Impossible Things:
But to me, the most intriguing is the weird bargaining, which very much like bargaining over death, is bargaining with yourself. For some time, since at least General Mark Milley’s quickly deflated trial balloon last November, there has been more and more talk from pundits and even sometimes from officials how Ukraine should negotiate with Russia, after some sort of retaking of ground so as to better Ukraine’s bargaining position.
Of course, the idea that Russia will do anything more than go through the motions of negotiating for appearances’ sake is delusional. As former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar reminded readers in his latest post, Putin warned Ukraine and its backers last July, the longer the conflict lasted, “the harder it will be to negotiate with us.” That was before Merkel and Hollande bragged about their Minsk Accords duplicity, which has led Putin to make embittered statements about what a mistake it had been to try to cooperate.
The ceasefire/frozen conflict talk is a new variant of what we saw in May. There is no way, given present facts, that Russia would agree to that.
First, Russia has deemed four formerly Ukraine oblasts as Russian territory. It has not secured full control of them and that step would be the bare minimum that Russia would accept, which means more territorial acquisition. Second and even more important, a stated aim of the Special Military Operation was the “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which the Istanbul negotiations showed could be met by the exit of NATO forces (little green men) and weapons from Ukraine and a commitment that Ukraine would never enter NATO. Note this negotiation took place before Porshenko, and later Merkel and Hollande admitted to entering into the Minsk Accords in bad faith and using it to buy time to arm Ukraine. The US and NATO officials have repeatedly said that who joins NATO is NATO’s business and they will never agree to restrict membership. So that requires Russia to continue to prosecute the war until NATO members are so drained that they are not capable of mounting a threat for a long time.
Third and most important, the Russian public would not accept a ceasefire. Putin is one of the least belligerent individuals in Russian public life.
Russia might have a problem selling the Global South on continuing to prosecute the war if Ukraine were to declare a unilateral ceasefire. But Russia succeeded in persuading them that Russia was not the bad guy in refusing to extend the Ukraine grain deal, that Ukraine and the West had persistently failed to live up to their part of the bargain, which critically included allowing Russia to ship fertilizer, which many of these countries badly needed.
On top of that. other developments in Ukraine seem at odds with Zelensky’s new improved war messaging. Alexander Mercouris’ report of August 28 gives two examples. One is that the Ukraine parliament is in the process of passing legislation to block any ceding of territory for peace (at 43:00). Second is that Ukraine plans yet another large mobilization (at 42:10).
So perhaps Zelensky is simply preparing the ground for a much wider set of options as his recent mantra of Ukraine settling only for its maximalist demands now clearly has no support among Ukraine allies (save the crazies in the Baltics who are not driving this train)
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
Zelensky is clearly preparing his people for a ceasefire, but he’s also talking about security guarantees from NATO and his country’s alleged production of its weapon systems, both of which will rankle Russia. The US’ recent elections pressure on him is for purely soft power purposes, but it still shows that their differences on a host of issues are growing after the failed counteroffensive.
The “Kyiv Post” reported on Zelensky’s latest TV interview here, the highlights of which will be shared below and then analyzed in the larger context of the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine:
* Zelensky is tacitly walking back his envisaged maximalist endgame by already declaring victory
– “It’s already clear that he [Putin] has not occupied us as he wanted. We did it, [we defended against his attack], this is already a great victory for the people.”
* He’s preparing the public for freezing the conflict along the lines of the Israeli-Palestinian one
– “We are ready to fight for a long time without losing people. It can be so. Minimize casualties following Israel’s example. You can live like that.”
* Ukraine believes that it’ll lose Western support if it invades Russia’s pre-2014 territory
– “There would be a big risk that we would be definitely left alone and on our own.”
* The “Israeli model” will likely characterize US-Ukrainian ties for the indefinite future
– “From the US, we probably have the Israeli model, where there are weapons, technologies, training, and financial aid.”
* Hard and soft security guarantees are actively being pursued
– “With the United States, it will be a more powerful bilateral treaty, with Britain – a strong one. There are states that simply do not have weapons, but they have finances, serious sanctions in case of repeated aggression.”
* An official NATO intervention could trigger World War III
– “We don’t need them, because it would be a NATO war, and that would mean the Third World War.”
* Ukraine might abandon military means for reconquering Crimea
– “I believe that it’s possible to politically push for the demilitarization of Russia on the territory of the Ukrainian Crimea. That would be better. Any combat would still have losses [casualties], wherever it is. Everything must be calculated.”
* Elections can be held next year if the West foots the bill and observers are sent to the trenches
– “If you [allies] are ready to give me 5 billion because I can’t just take 5 billion from the state budget. It seems to me that this is the amount needed to hold elections at a normal time. And in wartime, I don’t know what this amount is, that’s why I said – if the US and Europe give us financial support.
I’m sorry, I’m not asking for anything. I will not hold elections on credit. I will not take money from weapons and give it for elections either. The most important thing: let’s take risks together. The observers should then be in the trenches, they will need to be sent to the front line”
* Ukraine is now allegedly producing NATO weapon systems
– “We have domestic artillery on the battlefield today, using NATO-standard 155mm shells, which have never been seen before in Ukraine. We now have production and production of not one system, but several systems.”
These highlights show how drastically the conflict’s dynamics have shifted in the nearly three months since the counteroffensive began.
The first takeaway from Zelensky’s interview is that the counteroffensive failed, which is why he’s preparing the public for freezing the conflict. This is being achieved by already declaring victory, suggesting that Crimea can be reconquered through political means instead of military ones on the pretext of saving his soldiers’ lives, and referencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a future model. Ahead of that scenario, he wants to reassure his people that the West will still ensure their security.
To that end, he brought up the “Israeli model” as the likely way forward for US-Ukrainian relations together with a mix of hard and soft security guarantees from other NATO countries. Zelensky also appears aware of the Western public’s growing concerns that he’s leading everyone to World War III, which might be why he explicitly ruled out invading Russia’s pre-2014 territory together with denying that he has any interest in NATO formally intervening in his side’s support.
About that, it’s already involved in this conflict via the arms, intelligence, logistics, mercenary, training, and other forms of support that it’s provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but this is still below the level of dispatching uniformed troops to kill Russian soldiers. It also can’t be discounted that he’s worried about Poland unilaterally intervening in Western Ukraine, which readers can learn more about here and here, and that could be another reason why he warned that NATO troops could lead to World War III.
As for holding the now-delayed parliamentary elections sometime next year and not delaying the upcoming presidential ones that are scheduled for spring, this is a direct result of the pressure that Senator Lindsey Graham exerted on Zelensky during their meeting in Kiev last week. It’s the latest evidence that the failed counteroffensive is widening preexisting differences between the US and Ukraine all across the board, in this case over superficial commitments to “democracy”.
Readers can learn more about the latest difficulties in their ties by reviewing the following analyses:
* “A Vicious Blame Game Is Breaking Out After The Counteroffensive Predictably Failed”
* “US Policymakers Are Caught In A Dilemma Of Their Own Making After The Failed Counteroffensive”
* “The NYT & WSJ’s Critical Articles About Kiev’s Counteroffensive Explain Why It Failed”
In sum, both sides know that the counteroffensive failed, but neither wants to take responsibility for this.
A ceasefire of some sort therefore appears inevitable. The problem, however, is that freezing the conflict entails considerable reputational damage to the American and Ukrainian leaderships. Neither has yet to feel comfortable enough that their people fully blame the other for this debacle, hence why they remain reluctant to take the first step in what might then become a fast-moving process. It’s for this reason why they continue blaming each other and will likely continue doing so for the next few months at least.
President Putin made it clear on three occasions in mid-June that he was still interested in politically resolving the proxy war, but Zelensky’s latest claim that Ukraine is allegedly producing NATO weapon systems means that his reputation might also be damaged if he agrees to a ceasefire. After all, the special operation was partly commenced to demilitarize Ukraine and specifically eliminate the threat that NATO’s clandestine expansion there posed to Russia’s objective national security interests.
With Ukraine now openly producing NATO weapons systems, President Putin either has to ensure that these facilities are destroyed before agreeing to a ceasefire or informally freezing the conflict otherwise he stands to “lose face” among his domestic audience by tolerating this latent military threat. It might also be the case that Zelensky is just bluffing and could have lied about this just to make his Russian counterpart look bad in the event of a ceasefire, however, though nobody can really say for sure.
In any case, the Ukrainian leader’s latest TV interview drove home the point that the conflict’s dynamics have drastically shifted. Zelensky is clearly preparing his people for a ceasefire, but he’s also talking about security guarantees from NATO and his country’s alleged production of its weapon systems, both of which will rankle Russia. The US’ recent elections pressure on him is for purely soft power purposes, but it still shows that their differences on a host of issues are growing after the failed counteroffensive.
Looking forward, observers can expect the aforesaid to widen, but not to the point of rupturing their relations. The US-Ukrainian blame game will intensify during this period too as each side prepares their people for the seemingly inevitable scenario of freezing the conflict. As this is happening, Russia might also begin preparing its own people for the same, which could move the conflict towards the Israeli-Palestinian model by sometime next year unless something serious happens to derail this trajectory.
