“We are asking for respect.”
Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (aka AMLO) has warned Joe Biden and Justin Trudeau that he will not attend the upcoming North American Leaders Summit — the annual trilateral summit between the so-called “three amigos,” to be held in April in Quebec — if Mexico continues to be treated badly on a range of diplomatic and commercial fronts. His threat follows allegations by the US Drug Enforcement Agency, published in US and European media, that AMLO’s presidential campaigns of 2006 and 2018 had received funding from drug cartels.
“We are asking for respect, because we do not send Mexico’s intelligence agencies to investigate politicians in the United States, we do not do that,” said AMLO in his Wednesay morning press conference. “We do not send spies to China or Russia, we are not meddling in the United States, looking into which of the country’s arms manufacturers are financing which representatives and senators in that country.”
No Smoking Gun, Yet
So far, the allegations, drawn from DEA investigations in 2010 and 2018 that ended up going nowhere, allegedly in part due to political reasons, have lacked one key element: solid evidence. As I wrote a few weeks ago, that is not to say that AMLO himself or his government do not have close links with one or more of Mexico’s drug cartels. According to Anibal Hernandez, one of the journalists behind the “exposures,” insists they have incriminating evidence against AMLO; they are just waiting for the right moment to release it — presumably when it will do most damage to his party’s electoral campaign.
So far, however, there is no smoking gun; instead, all the articles appear to prove is that the DEA, which has been locked in a power struggle with AMLO government ever since he clipped the agency’s wings, including by stripping its agents of diplomatic immunity, in his 2020 security reforms, is determined to shape the outcome of Mexico’s election in such a way that either AMLO’s party, Morena, is defeated (highly unlikely given the paucity of credible opposition candidates and the stubbornly high levels of public support for AMLO) or, if elected, substantially weakened in the process.
There is almost certainly another motive at play, writes Carlos A. Pérez Ricart, a professor at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) and author of the book, Cien Años de Espias y Drogas: La Historia de los Agentes Anti-Narcóticos de los Estados Unidos en Mexico (100 Years of Spies and Drugs: The History of US Anti-Narcotic Agents in Mexico) — institutional self-preservation:
In both the stories of ProPublica, InSight Crime and Deutsche Welle, as well as that of The New York Times, I discern an accusation by the DEA of high-ranking Washington politicians. The meaning is unequivocal and can be summarised as follows: for “political” or “diplomatic” reasons, DEA agents cannot carry out the work for which they are mandated. The texts suggest a justification for the agency’s failures and an attempt to push political responsibility [for those failures] upwards…
In both cases the narrative is the same: the blame lies with the upper echelons of the US government, never with the anti-narcotics agency. The above must be understood in a context that is not necessarily clear in Mexico: the DEA is suffering from the greatest crisis of legitimacy in its history as a consequence of corruption cases within the agency… as well as its inability to stop the synthetic opioid crisis. Now, cornered by reality, the agency is trying to spread the blame as widely as possible and protect itself from the coming electoral cyclone in the United States.
A Rare Interview
In a rare interview, granted to the Spain-based Russian journalist Inna Afinogenova (who was the head of content for RT Spain until RT was banned from European networks and platforms), AMLO laid much of the blame for the scandal on Western media. Here’s a brief excerpt (you can watch the full exchange on the topic here, with English subtitles included):
AMLO: The right-wing in Mexico, and in the world, relies a lot on the media. It is fundamental for them. And that must be resisted, because the maxim of Goebbels, Hitler’s minister of propaganda, still holds. A lie that is repeated many times can become true, and that is what the owners of the means of, what I like to call manipulation rather than communication seek. That goes for the majority of media. There are some honourable exceptions in Mexico and abroad, because it is not just a matter of Mexico. Something just happened to us, for example.
IA: I was going to ask you about that, about the information that came out about the alleged narco financing in the 2006 campaign.
AMLO: Yes, a famous journalist came, awarded in the United States, from the NYT. Imagine, the NYT which remains a rag at the service of interest groups. And this man (Tim Golden), awarded twice with, what is the price called?
IA: Pullitzer. The most important one.
AMLO: The most important, yes. Well, the gentleman comes and makes a report which he headlines with question marks. “Did AMLO Receive Narco Support in 2006?” With question marks! Look how tricky, how cunning. What serious journalist can do that?
IA: Many do.
AMLO: No, but not a serious journalist. Well, it is part of the decadence of the noble profession of journalism
IA: Journalists who come out to say and endorse this information have prestige and are considered serious.
AMLO: Of course, they will have prestige if they serve the oligarchy a lot, the people who believe themselves to be the owner of the world. They are mere employees. That gentleman, with those awards, acted like a mercenary.
Now, AMLO is saying he will only attend the North American Leaders Summit if Mexico receives due respect from the US and Canada.
“If there is no respectful treatment, I will not participate (in the summit),” he said when asked about his attendance at the trilateral meeting, scheduled for April in Quebec City. “Also, I only have seven months left (of my mandate) and I do not like to travel much.” .
AMLO is angry not just at the DEA’s flagrant interference in Mexico’s electoral process, facilitated by some of the same media organisations that spent years decrying and embellishing Russia’s much less obvious meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, but about a host of other issues. They include the Canadian government’s recent decision to reinstate certain visa requirements for Mexicans amid a surge in asylum applications as well as threats from Washington to reimpose tariffs on imports of Mexican steel.
Washington alleges that China is using Mexico as an intermediary to supply its products to the US market. The allegations have elicited a strong denial from Mexico’s Economy Minister Raquel Buenrostro as well as a warning of potential retaliatory actions if the tariffs are levied. From Reuters:
“Imposing tariffs on steel is not convenient for either the United States or Mexico, because if there were tariffs, they would be impacted the most, given their larger presence in the market,” Buenrostro said.
Mexico’s share in the U.S. steel market stood at around 2.5% last year, while the U.S. presence in the Mexican market was about 14%, she noted.
Mexico in recent months has used tariffs to target steel imports from China, which has been accused of selling surplus steel abroad at below-market prices, a practice known as dumping.
A High-Stakes Gamble
It is a high-stakes game the US is playing. If Mexico were to retaliate by imposing 25% tariffs on US steel, as its economy minister has threatened, while lifting its tariffs on imports of Chinese steel, US steelmakers could suddenly find themselves priced out of Mexico’s market — and what’s more, at a time when the global steel sector is grappling with significant overcapacity, estimated at more than 674 million net tons per year, more than six times the total US steel market.
What’s more, Mexico’s relations between China, its second largest trade partner, appear to be on the up. AMLO held his first — and presumably last — meeting with Xi Jinping last November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), in San Francisco.
A month later, Mexico’s Foreign Secretary Alicia Bárcena Ibarra visited Beijing, where she met with China’s Vice President Han Zheng; Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Secretary of Commerce, Wang Wentao. Under discussion was the evolution of bilateral trade and investment flows between the two countries. According to La Jornada, the meeting closed with a joint commitment to continue working together to identify potential areas of interest that benefit both countries and their respective populations.
Then, immediately following the publication of the DEA’s allegations against him in early February, AMLO held a two-and-a-half hour meeting with China’s ambassador to Mexico in which he expressed his gratitude to Beijing for its support during difficult times for the country, such as the category 5 hurricane that devastated Acapulco in late October as well as all the material aid Beijing sent during the COVID-19 pandemic.
China’s economic footprint in Mexico is also growing. As we reported last May, Chinese companies are taking advantage of the United States’ nearshoring strategy by setting up shop in its southern neighbour, which more or less defies the purpose of the US’ nearshoring strategy. Chinese automakers are also rapidly increasing their influence in Mexico’s automotive sector, having gained a 20% market in Mexican car sales by the first half of 2023 and with companies such as BYD, Geely, Jetour, and Chirey expressing an interest in relocating production to Mexico, with an apparent view to capitalising on export opportunities not only in Latin America but also toward the US.
In response to this trend, a U.S. manufacturing advocacy group is lobbying Washington to block the imports of low-cost Chinese autos and parts to the country, Reuters reports:
“The introduction of cheap Chinese autos – which are so inexpensive because they are backed with the power and funding of the Chinese government – to the American market could end up being an extinction-level event for the U.S. auto sector,” the Alliance for American Manufacturing said in a report
The group argues the United States should work to prevent automobiles and parts manufactured in Mexico by companies headquartered in China from benefiting from a North American free trade agreement. “The commercial backdoor left open to Chinese auto imports should be shut before it causes mass plant closures and job losses in the United States,” the report said.
Constitutional Protections for Mexico’s Native Corn?
One other source of friction between the US and Mexico is, of course, GM corn. Some even suggest that the Biden Administration’s threat to reimpose Trump-era tariffs on Mexican steel is merely the latest escalation in the years-long conflict over the AMLO government’s ongoing desire to ban all imports of GM corn for human consultation. As all three North American countries (Canada joined the despite despite not exporting corn to Mexico) await the outcome of the dispute resolution process triggered by the US, the AMLO government is talking of introducing amendments to Mexico’s constitution to protect native maize varieties, designating them as objects of “national heritage.”
As for the dispute over Mexico’s commitment to energy independence, the issues have all apparently been resolved even as the AMLO government just finalised its purchase of 13 electricity plants from Spanish energy giant Iberdrola, giving the Mexican State just over 50% control of the electricity market. Three days ago, Buenrostro said at a press conference:
“In October (2023) we agreed that we were going to make a memorandum of understanding to scale down the consultation. A draft was prepared and they have had it since October; We have not received comments nor have they given us a meeting to follow up on any issues. We hope that it is not another of the things that pop up later, due to the elections. We have already concluded this issue.”
While AMLO is unlikely to follow through on his threat to boycott the North American Leaders’ Summit, given the potential ramifications of such a move just weeks before Mexico’s elections, the possibility cannot be fully discarded. He already boycotted the US-hosted 2022 Summit of Americas over the Biden government’s decision not to invite Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela to the event, causing significant embarrassment to the Biden administration. As an op-ed in Al Jazeera noted at the time, Washington’s decision to exclude Cuba “was not based on the larger Americas reality” but was rather “a cynical sop to Florida’s powerful anti-Cuba lobby” in the upcoming US midterm elections.
Which just goes to show how easily short-term electoral considerations can undermine diplomatic and/or trade relations with key strategic partners. And more than ever, Mexico and the US’ strategic partnership matters, not just because they share the world’s busiest land border but also because they are, for the first time in 20 years, each other’s biggest trade partner. However, as their economic interdependency grows, the relations between the two governments — and their respective agencies, mainly, of course, on the US side — are growing increasingly fraught. With do-or-die elections looming on both sides of the border, 2024 promises to be a turbulent year.