The question of “Whither the Ukraine conflict if Trump becomes President?” is, not surprisingly, far from clear-cut despite the Trump braggadocio that he can end the war in 24 hours. Rather than attempt an in-depth treatment, let’s look at some boundary conditions which look likely to constrain possibilities.
A negotiated outcome still seems impossible given justified Russian distrust of the West. Putin seemed genuinely embittered when he learned that Merkel and Holland had set out to deceive him with the Minsk Accords and buy more time to arm Ukraine. Putin regularly returns to the theme of Western bad faith in recent speeches, indicating this is a sore topic. Putin biographers have pointed out Putin makes a point of not repeating mistakes, which he did in trusting various Western officials in the past. A recent example is the famed Ukraine grain deal, which had two major components: Russia permitting transit and the West ending or suspending sanctions on Russian institutions so as to allow foreign countries to buy Russian fertilizer. The West welched on its half of the deal, leading Russia to withdraw by not authorizing an extension.
On top of that, Putin still has a strong bias to avoid more force commitment that necessary, if nothing else to spare Russian lives. So despite signs that many in the government in Moscow and potentially in Russia as a whole would prefer that he prosecute the war more aggressively, Putin appears to take the view that the current pacing is working out nicely. He has no reason to do more than continue to slowly and steadily increase the pressure on Ukraine forces until conditions change enough so that a different course of action is preferable.
Putin has dropped only a few hints as to what the final territorial disposition could look like (recall he has repeatedly said Odessa is a Russian city and pointed out that Kiev was part of ancient Rus). He still seems inclined to keep his options open. We’ve opined that occupying Western Ukraine or successfully installing a puppet government would be non-trivial. But their ease or difficulty also has some path dependence, based on how the Ukraine political and military collapse plays out.1 Even Reuters took note of Putin’s musing in June about capturing Kiev, which he noted would likely require more manpower:
President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that any further mobilisation would depend on what Russia wanted to achieve in the war in Ukraine, adding that he faced a question only he could answer – should Russia try to take Kyiv again?2
The reporting on Ukraine’s conditions and prospects, even though it is getting somewhat more realistic, is still well behind events. Press presentations matter because they are reflexive: they show what various interested parties want to present to the public, but they also influence and constrain the views of those same officials. Studies have repeatedly found that lawyers hired to defend parties they know are guilty come to believe their case for innocence. So even those officials who know Ukraine cannot win yet are tasked to touting Ukraine’s prospects wind up internalizing the idea that maybe Ukraine can somehow come out on top.
The media, Western leaders, and even it seems quite a few US/NATO leaders still do not seem to have come to grips with the fact that Russia is waging a war of attrition, and that therefore its territorial gains are no measure of Russian success to date. They are even further from recognizing that Russia is so dominant that it will in the end dictate terms, even if it takes its sweet time in getting to that point.
We do see more of the reporters admitting to Russian superiority in arms, such as a recent Wall Street Journal story that ‘fessed up that American’s vaunted wunderwaffen at most scored some initial blows to the Russian campaign, but Russia quickly worked out how to counter them. A new Reuters story re-confirms that the West is hopelessly behind on shell production: Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine.
But that does not mean the spin doctors have given up. For instance, Mediazona and the BBC had teamed up to track Russia deaths with a sound methodology: collect funeral data and other death notices. But they were coming up with numbers that Russians regarded as credible, consistent with the Mediazona level of between 50,000 and 60,000, which you might gross up by 50% to be conservative.3 (Russian Telegram is very active and very critical of the Russian military, albeit mainly from the vantage of calling for more vigorous prosecution of the war; the Telegrammers have contacts so that if there were a lot of military deaths, they would be making a huge stink and demanding that heads roll at the Ministry of Defense).3
But the Mediazona death count was embarrassing way below the recent reports of Ukraine deaths and serious injuries.4 Worse, Mediazona showed that Russia deaths in 2024 were way below 2022 levels, even as Russia has been moving into the offense (which should produce more losses, all things being equal).
That was apparently unacceptable. So Mediazona has adopted a new algo-based methodology. Viola! Russian deaths are suddenly way higher that the old verifiable level.
The bigger point here is simple: the West is still deep in denial. So even if Russia were suddenly to lose its mind and be willing to negotiate, the West would not accept that Ukraine was in dire shape and large concessions by the US and NATO were entirely reasonable. For instance, NATO is effectively leaving Russia with no option other than to completely subjugate Ukraine. At the just-concluded NATO summit, the alliance maintained that Ukraine joining NATO was irreversible.
RT reported the response by former Russian president and deputy Security Council chairman of Dmitry Medvedev:
NATO’s declaration that Ukraine’s eventual membership of the US-led military bloc is “irreversible” means that either the nation or the alliance – and preferably both – should disappear, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has said…
“The conclusion is obvious. We have to do everything to make sure that the ‘irreversible path of Ukraine’ towards NATO ends with either the disappearance of Ukraine, or the disappearance of NATO. Better, both,” Medvedev said on Thursday.
Trump has signaled he will reduce commitments to NATO, which means Ukraine too, but the psychological impact is likely to be greater than the practical difference. Trump is making clear, to much alarm, that he expects both NATO members and Taiwan to bear more of the cost of their defenses than they are bearing now. Amusingly, NATO has been discussing how to “Trump proof” the alliance, even after then NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg admitted many months back that NATO could not continue to back Ukraine without US support, as many outlets such as the BBC reported last week. This follows Congress passing a stipulation that no President could withdraw from NATO without Senate consent.
But the reality is that, as far as Ukraine is concerned, this matters less than it seems. The US and NATO have emptied their weapons caches to supply Ukraine, yet Russia has ample production capacity and stockpiles. The US under a new Democrat might prop up the Ukraine government longer than a Trump administration would, but given the difficulty of passing the last funding bill and Ukraine’s deterioration, that might not pass at all or amount to much if it did. More US support of Ukraine would increasing be a confidence game, to persuade Ukraine to keep throwing more men into the Russian maw, than a strategy with any hope of success.
European leaders would feel cast adrift. EU leaders are stunningly doubling down on Project Ukraine. They seem to be externalizing their frustration with their inability to turn the war around with their unhinged attacks on Hungarian president Viktor Orban for the temerity of talking to key players about peace in Ukraine. Orban had just assumed a rotating six month presidency of the EU Council, which despite the pretenses of the wannbe queen of Europe, EU Commission chair Ursula von der Leyen, is the premier executive group for the Union. Even though Orban had disavowed operating as EU president in undertaking his listening tour to Zelensky, Putin, Xi and Trump, he nevertheless was taking advantage of his higher profile.
The unified and vicious official European reaction to even tentatively exploring a settlement to the war has been revealing. Since this post is getting long, we will limit ourselves to a sampling of headlines:
European Commission President slams Orbán’s “appeasement mission” to Moscow
The European Commission boycotts the Hungarian presidency due to Orban’s unexpected visit to Russia
Reuters: EU chief criticizes Hungary’s Orban for ‘peace mission’ talks with Trump
And now threats of serious punishment, albeit not (yet) with any teeth, via Reuters:
A group of 63 European Parliament lawmakers has asked the EU to withdraw Hungary’s voting rights in the bloc, in response to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s recent visits to Moscow and Beijing….
The lawmakers have no formal ability to strip Hungary of its voting rights, but seek to add political pressure on Brussels to take tougher action towards Budapest.
The European Commission said on Monday it would stop sending Commissioners to informal meetings organised by the Hungarian EU presidency, downgrading its participation to instead send civil servants.
These aggressive moves to stuff Orban in a box come at the same time other NATO leaders make unhinged professions of fealty to Ukraine over the interests of their own country:5
I won’t allow Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, and the dirty money it generates, to flow freely through European waters and put our security at risk.
Ukraine is, and always will be, at the heart of my government’s agenda.
— Keir Starmer (@Keir_Starmer) July 19, 2024
Aurelien predicted a long time ago that the EU would eventually settle into epic pouting over its unsuccessful Ukraine adventure. But a lot of difficult psychological, political, and messaging adjustment is in store before the bloc comes to grips with its failure.
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1 For instance, there are now rumors that Ukraine’s top commander, General Syrzki, has determined Ukraine cannot win the war and is now calling for negotiations. But the neo-Nazis have repeatedly threatened Zelensky if he were to try:
Neo-Nazi Azov commanders already twice openly threatened Zelensky when he indicated willingness to negotiate https://t.co/VSz3yt6y4f
— Ivan Katchanovski (@I_Katchanovski) July 19, 2024
This is entirely predictable since the Russians want the Banderites removed from power and marginalized in society, plus any who played a role in torturing Russian soldiers (and there are lots of ugly videos) or killing POWs can expect a not happy future.
So if military situation continues to deteriorate, Zelenksy is likely to flee rather than attempt negotiations. That makes sense additionally because Putin has made clear he does not regard Zelensky as a legitimate head of government. He has said it is up to Ukraine to make a determination, but his reading of the Ukraine constitution is that the head of the Rada is now in charge. And that is before getting to the point that Putin, Lavrov, and many others have made: Ukraine is only a proxy and any negotiations would have to take place with the US (and perhaps NATO too).
So a new, and undeniably illegitimate government would take over. How the US, UK and EU try to pretty that up is over my pay grade. But given a military coup or other form of non-elected leadership running Ukraine, Russia re-installing the what would arguably the last legitimate regime, that of Viktor Yankovich, who was ousted in the Maidan coup and the effort to legitimate his removal fell afoul of the Constitution (too few ratifying votes in the Rada) might look not-so-bad compared to what followed a Zelensky exodus.
2 The distortions in Western reporting seem pervasive. Russia did not “take” Kiev in 2022, but merely engaged in a pinning operation. It would have required a massive force commitment to have any hope of seizing Kiev, a sprawling city of 3 million.
3 Russian Telegram is very active and very critical of the Russian military, albeit mainly from the vantage of calling for more vigorous prosecution of the war. The Telegrammers have extensive contacts with active duty soldiers. So if there were a lot of military deaths, they would be making a huge stink and demanding that heads roll at the Ministry of Defense)
4 Mind you, both the now-admitted huge disparity in Russian shelling v. Ukrainian and the fact that Ukraine, until recently, has been attempting to launch offenses, means Ukraine should be expected to be losing a lot more men than Russia.
5 Recall German Green Party leader and defense minister Annelina Baerbock similarly said defending Ukraine was more important than German voter interests.