The funny thing about being a European during American presidential elections is the belief that you, too, should be allowed to vote. And can you blame us? Who gets to occupy the Oval Office is correctly seen by many in Europe as a decision of existential significance for the well-being and security of the continent.

No surprise, then, that even with a war raging in Europe involving repeated nuclear threats by the Kremlin, the developments in the U.S. campaigns have received even greater attention in the European press than usual. Given the war in Ukraine, the risks of a larger war in the Middle East and China’s accelerating challenge to American primacy, Europe needs the United States more than it has since the end of the Cold War. And America still has a unique and valuable asset that its growing list of rivals and adversaries don’t: reliable allies and partners in Europe.

Over the years, the Munich Security Conference, the international security forum that I led for 14 years, has tallied a long list of trans-Atlantic to-dos. At its core are three strategic challenges that America and Europe will need to face, regardless of who wins the U.S. election in November. How we deal with them will decide whether the trans-Atlantic alliance will continue as the tight-knit partnership we have known for the past 75 years or unravel.

First: We need to talk about China. Unlike the European Union, which defines China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival, America appears to have concluded, in a rare show of bipartisan agreement, that China is now not only its key rival but also its main long-term adversary in terms of global political and military power and influence. Trans-Atlantic discord about how best to deal with China is already visible, and it seems bound to get worse.

When it comes to handling Russia, Europe and the United States have had an elaborate consultation and coordination mechanism for the past seven decades: NATO. With China, there is nothing comparable. Why wasn’t Europe consulted when the United States decided to deny certain semiconductor chips from being exported to China? Is there any agreed strategy on Taiwan? As seen from Europe, the increasingly popular idea in Washington that America should focus on China and leave Ukraine for the Europeans to deal with is outright dangerous. Many Europeans feel that China may very well interpret declining U.S. support for Ukraine as a sign of weakness. (Remember Afghanistan?)

The creation of a fully staffed body focused on coordinating on China and the Asia Pacific region should be high on our common agenda. An enlarged Group of 7 that includes Australia, South Korea and potentially other regional powers could be one option, though maybe not a sufficient one.