Because we are now in the midsts of what Lambert likes to call an overly dynamic situation, this post will be comparatively brief. As most of you know already, there was great excitement over the news of a ceasefire pact between Israel and Hamas, with the prospect that the horrific punishment of Gazans might stop, if not their suffering due to the physical destruction of Gaza and the deaths and maiming of so many of its inhabitants. However, despite widespread reports of a six-month ceasefire and phased withdrawal having been agreed, in fact the deal is still in play. Even with the Trump team trying to lower the hammer on the US-dependent Israel government, the agreement has not been approved by the Knesset. From Aljazeera’s live stream:

And a very fresh entry on the Times of Israel live stream has Netanyahu’s office trying to accuse Hamas of acting in bad faith.

In fact many commentators (forgive me for not providing supporting links) have pointed out the outline of terms (save the duration of the ceasefire, which IIRC is longer than past proposals) is essentially the same as what Hamas agreed to before but Israel wriggled out of by repeatedly making last minute additional demands.

The tweet below was based on the earlier premature reports of the ceasefire agreement, which would not be effective until January 19, having been consummated. But even so, this action would be true to form, of Israel upping its destruction right before cessation-of-hostilities agreements become effective:

Continuing Israel attacks on Gaza, suggest that even if Israel goes though the motions of capitulating to US demands, it will work hard to defy them, much like a willful teenager. And Israel has form here:

For the sake of completeness, a summary of the ceasefire provisions. Note they look unduly fuzzy and incomplete (save on the key issue of prisoner exchanges). Fram SBS:

Here’s what we know about the deal so far.

The first phase

The initial phase will last six weeks and will involve a limited hostage-prisoner exchange, the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops in Gaza and a surge of aid into the enclave.

Thirty-three Israeli hostages will be released in this phase of the agreement, with those first released to be “civilian women and female recruits, as well as children, elderly people … civilian ill people and wounded”,[{Qatar’s Prime Minister] Al Thani said.

In terms of the Palestinian prisoners that would be exchanged for the 33 hostages, Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer said on Tuesday that Israel was “prepared to pay a heavy price — in the hundreds”.

Israel will release all Palestinian women and children under 19 detained since the October 7 attacks by the end of the first phase. The total number of Palestinians released will depend on the hostages released and could be between 990 and 1,650 Palestinian detainees, including men, women and children….

An Israeli buffer zone

Negotiations over a second phase of the agreement will begin by the 16th day of phase one and are expected to include the release of the remaining captives, including Israeli male soldiers, a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli forces would not fully withdraw from Gaza until “all hostages are returned”, the Israeli official said.

A source close to Hamas said Israeli forces would withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor westward toward Salaheddin Road to the east, enabling displaced people to return through an electronic checkpoint equipped with cameras….

Critical aid

The first phase will also see international aid agencies gain increased access and protections in Gaza.

The deal requires 600 truckloads of humanitarian aid to be allowed into Gaza every day of the ceasefire, 50 of them carrying fuel, with 300 of the trucks allocated to the enclave’s north…

The United Nations said on Tuesday it was busy preparing to expand humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip under a potential ceasefire but uncertainty around border access and security in the enclave remain obstacles…

Israel passed laws in October banning the UN Palestinian aid agency UNRWA — which the UN says is the backbone of aid operations in Gaza — from operating in the region.

The laws, which prohibit UNRWA from operating on Israeli land and having contact with Israeli authorities, is due to take effect later this month.

What happens next?

Details on the potential second and third phases of the ceasefire deal remain unclear.

Under the arrangements outlined by Qatar, the details of phases two and three will be “finalised” during the implementation of phase one…

Biden said phase two would comprise an exchange for the release of remaining hostages who are still alive, including the male soldiers. Then all remaining Israeli forces would withdraw from Gaza, he said.

Israel has said it will not agree to a complete withdrawal until Hamas’ military and political capabilities are eliminated.

Needless to say, with the later phases to be negotiated, it seems plenty likely this deal will break down unless the Trump Administration is serious about keeping Israel on a short leash, or whether this deal is merely a one-off, with the Trump crowd lacking the persistence and/or intent to keep the scheme from going off the rails, which Israel will work hard to achieve.

It’s hardly a secret that Israel has made a mockery of its 60 day ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, with strikes and incursions into southern Lebanon continuing (the only serious effect of that pact seems to be a halt of bombing of Beirut).

Even early on, Israel largely ignored the Lebanon pact:

One of the critical elements to restoring a thin semblance of survivability in the ravaged Gaza is large daily deliveries of aid: 600 trucks of food including 50 of fuel. Israel has persistently fallen short of past supply delivery commitments, even going so far as to empty bags of sugar and refill them with sand. Even if Israel were to be uncharacteristically complaint about the other elements of the Gaza ceasefire, seriously underdelivering on aid commitments will be enough to continue the slow-motion destruction of what is left in the way of life in Palestine. I see nothing so far that obligates Israel to restore other absolutely essential services, starting with electricity and water. And what about the completely destroyed hospital system? What happens with medical care?

Now admittedly, the Trump team refusing to be cowed by Netanyahu and trying to get him to operate as if Israel is what it is, a US dependency, is a step in the right direction. Even though the incoming Administration has voiced fierce opposition to the major actors in The Resistance, it appears dead set against letting Israel embroil the US in a conflict with Iran, which has long been a pet aim and personal continued survival strategy of Netanyahu’s. Importantly, the Trump Administration may be trying to curb the eschatological bent of the Israeli hardliners along with their dangerous beliefs about Israel’s right to seize yet more territory, not just parts of Lebanon but also Egypt and Jordan.

However, the Israel press is saying the deal is all a big show:

There is another school of thought. Alastair Crooke, in his discussion with Judge Napolitano at the start of the week, that the Trump quid pro quo for the ceasefire is allowing Israel a free hand with ethnic cleansing of the West Bank, where Israel has been able to use less visibly destructive means than in Gaza.

But if so, why would Netanyahu impede the Knesset ratification? The tweet above may instead signify that Netanyahu is trying to preserve his image in Israel and also believes he can ignore any commitment, violate the ceasefire, and see if the US dares to take concrete action.

Keep in mind that even if, out of what one expects from the US, that Trump actually does want this deal to stick so as to greatly reduce the heat level in the Middle East and free up his Administration to address other priorities, Israeli extremists could put the region in turmoil all on their own, with the mother of all provocations being blowing up the Al Aqsa mosque.

Aurelien, in an important new post on negotiations to end hostilities, gave the diplomat’s version of the commercial adage, that contracts are only as good as the parties that sign them:

Agreements, whether simple or elaborate, whether legal or political in nature, whether written or verbal, have no more effect than the willingness of parties to implement them, and no more significance than the good faith of parties in entering into them in the first place

There is plenty of commentary, such as from a new video by Iran’s Professor Mohammed Marandi on Dialogue Works on how the ceasefire confirms the effectiveness of The Resistance campaign, to a new article by Daniel Herst, Gaza ceasefire: After 15 months of brutality, Israel has failed on every front, that this agreement represents a loss for Israel. Recall the point made by Alastair Crooke and Scott Ritter, among others, from the outset: if Hamas survived, it won. Similarly, the refusal of Gazans to surrender their land, even at such horrific cost, is a victory if this deal sticks, even if at huge cost. Hence the high motivation of Israel to deny that success.

So I wish I were wrong, but getting optimistic about real relief for Gazans seems misplaced.

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This entry was posted in Doomsday scenarios, Middle East, Politics on by Yves Smith.