Yves here. As regulars have likely noticed, Simon Watkins is a fire-breathing neocon and so what he says often has to be corrected as well as discounted. But with that, his piece often have interesting nugget and even when not, serve as expositions of hardline views.
Here we have self-discrediting Watkins blather right at the top, depicting the talks in Oman as direct when they were indirect, but the principal negotiators encountered each other and exchanged brief pleasantries on the way out. The headline also depicts the terms below as if they were the inter-state analogue to a letter of intent (preliminary terms agreed by both sides) as opposed to the apparent US ask for the next meeting on Saturday the 19th. He shows his lack of knowledge of this beat by depicting Iran as having an incentive to run out the talks till the JCPOA snapback provisions expire in October. In fact, the runway is much shorter, since there is a not-trivial formal process to executing the snapback (for instance, Iran has a right to present its defense against the charges of violations). So the real drop dead date for the snapback is in June, not October.
Even with these caveats. Watkins may have some intel on what the US is set to propose next week…or at least what the diehards want to present. Keep in mind that the outline below is radically at odds with the impression Iran seems to have gotten after the inaugural indirect meeting last week. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made very positive noises about the initial round. That has led the YouTubers who opine on the Middle East to view the negotiations as going in the direction of a JCPOA-like deal, as in restrictions on Iran’s nuclear weapons program in return for sanctions relief, with perhaps some tightening of certain elements so Trump could declare a win.
By contrast, despite pretending to be a new and improved JCOPA the list below prominently features Iran giving up a key element of sovereignity, as in having Iran provide the US will full access to banking system records as well as 47 companies registered in other countries, and to restrict the development of new conventional missiles. The financial requirements are designed to cut of Iranian financing of members of the Resistance and to allow the US to impede foreign weapons purchases. I can’t see any state, and certainly not Iran, agreeing to this. Since when to outsiders get full access to all of the personal and commercial transactions made within a country, and even by key entities operating in other nation.
Notice that the article below depicts the financial terms (and another point, the indefinite presence of weapons inspectors in Iran….) as being in a “new rough draft”. Because the talks were indirect, it seems very unlikely any written documents were passed from room to room. The opening session would normally be to feel each other out and if that went well, to present positions and ideas at a very high level. So if my reading is correct, the Iranians will regard this “new rough draft” as so extreme as to amount to a retrade of the earlier week’s talks. “Retrade” = bad faith negotiating.
Shortly after this post went live, the Wall Street Journal published U.S. Softens Position on Iranian Uranium Enrichment. Key part:
U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said that the Trump administration is prepared to allow Iran to enrich uranium at a low level if it is subject to stringent verification, a significant shift from the White House’s initial demand that Tehran’s nuclear program be dismantled.
The position, if adopted during talks that are to resume Saturday following an initial meeting last weekend, would leave Iran with a toehold on a nuclear program and put the U.S. at odds with Israel’s goals on the question.
“They do not need to enrich past 3.67%,” Witkoff said on Fox News Monday night. “This is going to be much about verification on the enrichment program and then ultimately verification on weaponization.”
If the permitted level is effectively nil, inspectors are in Iran all the time, this sop does not matter in practice. In fact, it would be consistent with tougher terms elsewhere. But we’ll know more in due course.
By Simon Watkins, a former senior FX trader and salesman, financial journalist, and best-selling author. He was Head of Forex Institutional Sales and Trading for Credit Lyonnais, and later Director of Forex at Bank of Montreal. He was then Head of Weekly Publications and Chief Writer for Business Monitor International, Head of Fuel Oil Products for Platts, and Global Managing Editor of Research for Renaissance Capital in Moscow. Originally published at OilPrice
- High-level negotiations between U.S. and Iranian officials in Muscat focused on a new nuclear deal.
- The deal includes several new provisions, such as indefinite weapons inspections in Iran and access to financial records of companies linked to the IRGC.
- Iran is pushing for more sanctions relief and guarantees regarding Israel’s military presence in the region.
The temperature in downtown Muscat over the weekend was 35 degrees Celsius, but for the swarms of high-level officials from the U.S. and Iran buzzing around busily discussing a new ‘nuclear deal’ it probably felt a lot hotter than that. On the one side was the delegation from the U.S. who found themselves in direct talks with their Iranian counterparts largely because their President threatened military action against the Islamic Republic if they did not attend.
Washington’s core aim is to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons and to prevent Israel from launching a massive attack on the country which could ignite a war across the Middle East. On the other side were the Iranian negotiators whose presence attested to the depth of their country’s economic malaise, leaving the government facing increased public discontent and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unable effectively spread Iran’s version of Islam around the world. Tehran’s core aim is to avoid being gain sanctions relief to rebuild its economy and influence via the IRGC and its proxies, and to avoid a huge military assault by Israel, backed by the U.S. So, what was discussed and what will happen next?
“The deal on the table was – and remains – the same in essence as the deal [U.S. President Donald] Trump wanted to put in place after he withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or colloquially ‘the nuclear deal’] in May 2018,” a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s (E.U.) security complex exclusively told OilPrice.com over the weekend.
“However, the new rough draft includes two additional points which [Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin] Netanyahu managed to get DT [Donald Trump] agreeing to: first, the indefinite presence of weapons inspectors in Iran, and second, complete access to the banking and financial records of Iranian banks and 47 companies registered in 16 countries that are the most closely associated with the IRGC and related operations,” he added. Over and above these two key new additions, three ‘core concepts’ that underpinned the original 2015 JCPOA remain in the new rough draft.
As analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order, the first was the safety and security of U.S. troops from Iranian or Iranian-sponsored attacks around the globe; the second was the safety and security of Israel; and the third is that Iran will never seek to manufacture, acquire, deploy or use any nuclear weapons. Twelve specific clauses were geared towards these aims and remain broadly in place, although some have been toughened up, and one has been dropped (‘to withdraw all forces under Iran’s command throughout the entirety of Syria’). Two – dealing with activities connected to various of Iran’s proxies have been incorporated into other clauses.
The first was to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear programme and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity. The second is to stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing, including closing its heavy water reactor. The third is to provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country. The fourth is to end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems. The fifth is to release all U.S. citizens as well as citizens of U.S. partners and allies. The sixth is to end support to Middle East terrorist groups. The seventh is to respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilisation and reintegration of Shia militias. The eighth is to cease regular military support and support from the IRGC and related entities for terrorists and militant partners around the world. And the ninth is to end its threatening behaviour against its neighbours, including its threats to destroy Israel.
For its part, Tehran’s negotiators also began discussions over the weekend in Oman with elements discussed not just with Trump’s team back in 2018 but also those which had been discussed with the team of Barack Obama that put together the original JCPOA in 2015. It is interesting to note here that Trump’s original template for a harder line nuclear deal with Iran after the U.S.’s withdrawal from its in 2018 was virtually identical to this original tough version that former President Obama wanted to implement, as also detailed in full in my latest book.
At those points – and now – Iran wanted three main items considered. First, compensation by the U.S. for the damage done by sanctions to its economy. Second, immediate access to all of Iran’s frozen deposits in Europe, the Far East and everywhere else. Third, guarantees that Israel does not continue to increase its intelligence and military presence in the region to threaten the security of Iran. “The first of these can be negotiated around easily enough by stressing that any substantive sanctions relief given from the U.S. to Iran once a new deal has been agreed will ultimately compensate for monies lost as a result of previous sanctions,” the E.U. source told OilPrice.com over the weekend. “The third one too should be easy enough to get around, as the U.S. can say it will do its best to ensure that Israel abides by the spirit of any new agreement, although ultimately it cannot dictate Israeli foreign policy on any country,” he added. “The second condition is more difficult, as Europe is not included in these talks [in Oman], which was a tactical mistake by the U.S., I think,” he underlined.
The reason for this is that the European members of the P5-plus-1 Group that signed the 2015 JCPOA on 14 July – France, UK, ‘plus’ Germany (the other signatories being the U.S., Russia and China) – are the only ones capable of implementing the additional ‘snapback sanctions’ on Iran ahead of their expiry date of 18 October this year. These comprise a comprehensive range of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran that were lifted from the Iranian economy when the 2015 JCPOA was signed. These would include multiple new financial sanctions on companies and individuals and increased surveillance by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF has 40 active criteria and mechanisms in place to prevent money laundering — an activity that is vital to the IRGC’s activities across the world. It also has nine criteria and mechanisms in place to do the same for the financing of terrorism and related activities — again, a core of the IRGC’s role in promoting Iran’s brand of Islam around the globe. The FATF also has swingeing powers to wield against individuals, companies, or countries who transgress any of its standards and is extremely aggressive in using them by degrees, depending on whether the sanctioned entity is on its ‘grey’ or ‘black’ list. “The U.K. and France are tuned in to demand an immediate triggering after the [October] deadline, perhaps because they have more accurate information about the stockpile of Iran’s enriched material, increased number of Russian nuclear scientists sent to Iran between June 2024 and February 2025 and the three top missile experts from Pyongyang who have been in Iran for 140 days or so,” said the E.U. source. “We are told that the progress on weaponisation know-how has been expedited to critical levels,” he underlined.
It is clearly in Iran’s interests to have as many of the current sanctions against it removed. This would allow it time to rebuild its economy and to re-finance the activities of the IRGC and its proxies. However, during every previous round of direct and indirect talks on creating a new JCPOA, the sticking point has been the insistence of the U.S. and its allies for Iran to agree to adhering to the principles of the FATF. The underlying aim here was to erode the foundation of the regime established in the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its ongoing power as exercised through the guardians of that revolution – the IRGC – and Iran knows this. Consequently, said the Iran source, the negotiators from Tehran will push for any measures that threaten this scenario not to be present in any new JCPOA.
Failing that, the Iranian team is likely to keep negotiations going until past the 18 October deadline for the snapback of UNSC sanctions by the European signatories of the original nuclear deal. “This may also give them [the IRGC] some breathing space to reorganise and regroup ahead of any new major Israeli attacks against the nuclear facilities,” the E.U. source said. “Typically Iran thinks by delaying the negotiations they may be able to get more concessions from the U.S. — a tried and tested approach that has failed for the past forty-five years or so,” he concluded.