There are increasing signs of a thaw between yesterday’s terrorists/today’s legitimate government in Damascus and the US/Israel-backed Kurds of northeastern Syria. That means that Türkiye and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are either being sidelined or are party to the idea of a peace with the Kurds. While the latter seems unlikely, there are reasons that Türkiye might have no choice but to agree.
We’ll get to those below, but first a quick update on reports of the fighting between Turkish-aligned mercenaries and Kurdish forces. More than 100 fighters were killed over the weekend in northern Syria mostly in villages around the city of Manbij. Turkish Minute with more:
Turkish-backed factions in northern Syria resumed their fight with the SDF at the same time Islamist-led rebels were launching an offensive on November 27 that overthrew Syrian president Bashar al-Assad just 11 days later.
They succeeded in capturing the cities of Manbij and Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo province from the SDF.
The SDF controls vast areas of Syria’s northeast and parts of Deir Ezzor province in the east where the Kurds created an autonomous administration following the withdrawal of government forces during the civil war that began in 2011.
Ankara considers the SDF an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has fought a decades-long insurgency in southeastern Türkiye and is designated as a terrorist organization by the government.
Here’s what it roughly translates to on a map:
Is Erdogan Being Sidelined?
Now to the political maneuvering. Türkiye was widely assumed to be urging the new Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham regime in Damascus to avoid any dialogue with the Kurds. A meeting with Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, recently took place nonetheless. From Asharq Al Awsat:
A representative of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), stated that the recent meeting between the SDF leadership and the new Syrian administration in Damascus addressed only military issues. Bassem Ishak, head of the SDC’s Washington office, described the discussions as positive, focusing on operational coordination and shared concerns.
Since opposition forces entered Aleppo late last year, SDF leaders have maintained direct contact with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to protect Kurdish communities and other residents in areas like Tal Rifaat and the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo. Ishak emphasized that the coordination between the SDF and the “Operation Room to Deter Aggression” has been ongoing since December 8, covering military operations and field developments.
This meeting marked the first between SDF leaders and Ahmed Al-Sharaa since the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad. It comes amid continued clashes between Kurdish fighters and Turkish-backed factions in northern Syria, particularly around Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and Tal Rifaat, areas now under Turkish control.
Washington is believed to have been the driver of the meeting, which highlights the fact that if HTS wants to effectively run Syria, it needs revenue from the US/Kurdish occupied northeast. From Al-Monitor:
The HTS-led administration wants at least 70% of all oil revenue, while the SDF wants half, he claimed. Another is the proposed integration of the SDF into the Syrian national army. The HTS wants a complete dissolution of the SDF. This mirrors Ankara’s demands. The SDF wants to retain its own local structures that would, in theory, be under Damascus’ central command.
HTS now looks to be taking a softer stance towards the Kurds than Ankara — at least on the surface — would like:
“The Kurds are part of our people” and “we are open to a negotiation path with the SDF,” Syria’s transitional government leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa tells Al Arabiya News.
Read more: https://t.co/l0tDnP7xM1 pic.twitter.com/Mrp6Jzd6RW
— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) December 31, 2024
Two ways to read this. One is that it was organized behind Türkiye’s back and Erdogan and company are fuming. The other is that it’s part of a wider agreement taking shape. Both might be true.
Erdogan has roughly two options, which we’ll explore in the rest of this piece:
- Continue the fight against Kurds, potentially using more of the Turkish military. This could lead to direct confrontation with Americans on the battlefield and, more importantly, a firestorm of economic consequences.
- Work out some deal with the Americans that while a blow to Ankara’s goal of total victory against Kurds could bring major economic benefits and help with neo-Ottoman ambitions in any coming fight with Iran.
And it might not be all that much of a choice either as his proxies in Syria find new friends. From Al-Monitor:
Interestingly, Syria’s new top diplomat, Asaad Al-Shaibani, made his first overseas visit to Saudi Arabia, not Türkiye, even though Türkiye’s top diplomat, Hakan Fidan, and its intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, were the first top foreign officials to travel to Damascus after the fall of the Assad regime. Al-Shaibani was accompanied by the minister of defense, Murhaf Abu Qasra, and spy chief Anas Khattab.
Muslim suggested that Ankara would feel slighted. Türkiye lacks the financial means to help rehabilitate war-ravaged Syria. HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s priority is to consolidate power, and he can do that only by delivering to his impoverished nation. Hence, Ankara is probably unlikely to make a fuss at this time.
Adam Clements, a former US diplomat and Pentagon official, told Al Jazeera:
“Saudi Arabia would have a big role as well … at the outset of construction and reconstruction. Syria is very dependent on Iran for oil and fuel, and so I think Gulf States could also support that as well.”
Lo and behold, on Monday the US issued a “sanctions pause” authorizing certain transactions with the Syrian government, including some energy sales and incidental transactions.
In a recent interview with Saudi-owned Al Arabiya television, Syria’s al-Julani said Riyadh “will certainly have a large role in Syria’s future”, pointing to “a big investment opportunity for all neighbouring countries.”
Ankara would of course be unable to match investments from the Gulf, but it and especially its construction industry could benefit greatly from all that oil and gas money pouring in.
Riyadh, along with Tel Aviv, has supported the Kurds in the past primarily as an avenue to weaken Iran but also with an eye to gaining leverage over Türkiye and Iraq. Nevertheless, Saudi and other Gulf money coming into Syria would be welcome news in some industries of Türkiye where the economy is in recession in part due to sky high interest rates that are trying to bring record levels of inflation under control. Türkiye is also experiencing an extreme cost-of-living crisis with the twelve-month average inflation rate a reported 58.51 percent (with some arguing it’s much higher); meanwhile retirees are seeing their pensions go up by only 15.75 percent and more fall below the hunger threshold. Unsurprisingly Turks are not happy, and pressure is on Erdogan to improve the economy.
That makes this an inopportune time to take on the American-backed Kurds in Syria. It makes it more likely he’ll look to cut a deal (Türkiye could likely live with an agreement that sees Kurdish-controlled areas remain part of Syria) and save the fight for another day.
Sanctions Relief and Defense Industry Assistance
As we noted at the time, there were signs something was afoot with the US and Türkiye ahead of the offensive that toppled Assad. Washington began talking about relief for Türkiye from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act and its vassals in Europe suddenly ended a years-long unofficial embargo on selling Türkiye defense industry products.
That trend continues.
Not only are Europeans exporting to Türkiye again, they’re now buying Turkish defense products.
In December Spain agreed to purchase 24 Hurjet jet trainers produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries, and Portugal signed a deal for Türkiye’s state-owned Defense Technologies Engineering Corporation to build two replenishment ships — the first exports of manned Turkish jets and military vessels to NATO allies. Also in December, Baykar, which is owned by the family of Erdogan’s son-in-law, Selcuk Bayraktar, acquired Italian aviation company Piaggio Aerospace — another sign of Türkiye’s growing defense presence in Europe.
These agreements will boost a Turkish defense industry that has been steadily growing (on Friday Türkiye announced that its defense industry exports surpassed $7.1 billion last year) despite restrictions in the West.
Türkiye is eager to not only keep these deals but continue its defense industry export growth.
Sanctions and a return of any embargo on much-needed engines and power systems for its domestic projects could derail that progress, which means Erdogan and company likely have limits on how far they can push on the Kurds.
So we can see how peace with the Kurds could go hand in hand with Türkiye’s defense industry goals, it could help unlock some semblance of stability in Syria, which could bring in Gulf money and therefore boost the Turkish construction industry in Syria. An improving Syria situation also means that the nearly four million Syrian refugees in Türkiye could legitimately think of returning home.
Erdogan is facing pressure on the economy and the refugees. Assuming he’s able to make progress on those fronts and set himself up for reelection, that’s another reason he must consider peace with the Kurds: he needs them in order to change the constitution so he can run for another term in the next presidential election scheduled for no later than May 7, 2028.
Kurdish Peace Talks
While the Türkiye-Kurdish fight continues in Syria, there are signs this could be an escalate-to-de escalate strategy from Ankara.
Reports began to emerge in October — around the same time we began to see a thaw between Türkiye and the West on unofficial defense industry embargoes — about Türkiye seeking some sort of peace agreement with the PKK. The reasons were two-fold:
- to prevent Iran from reaching out to Kurdish fighters to destabilize Türkiye during a possible escalation with US-Israel(-Türkiye?).
- Erdogan needs the support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) in order to pass a new constitution that would allow him to run for another term.
These talks continue. In the final days of 2024, two members of parliament from DEM visited Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK and sole inmate at İmralı Prison on an island in the Sea of Marmara. Erdogan allies have hinted at the potential of parole for Ocalan in return for a disbanding of the PKK, terms which the organization rejects, but the fact that there are talks at all is a shocking turn of events. And it’s certainly interesting that the meeting between HTS and the Syrian Kurds came soon after Ocalan met with DEM party representatives.
That latter meeting might also signal weakness on Erdogan’s part. From Turkish Minute:
In his desperation to counter the formation of a Kurdish region and status quo in Syria, Erdoğan has sought to bring Öcalan back into the public discourse. By presenting himself as a leader dealing with Türkiye’s Kurds domestically, Erdoğan aims to deflect attention from the reality of a Kurdish administration forming beyond Türkiye’s borders for the second time during his tenure.
At the end of the day, if HTS is making nice with the Syrian Kurds and receiving more support than Türkiye can offer from the likes of the US, Israel, and Gulf states, what option does Erdogan have? To send in the Turkish military, which would be problematic for many of the reasons stated above. The Americans, aside from nonchalantly announcing that the US has approximately 1,100 more soldiers in Syria than previously mentioned, are also (maybe) expanding their presence in northeastern Syria.
Americans Back in Kobane?
Türkiye’s paramilitary forces are reportedly aiming for the cities of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, and al-Tabqa before advancing towards Raqqa.That could put them in direct contact with American forces stationed in northeast Syria.
A few days into the new year reports began emerging that the US is building a base in this northern Syrian city on the Turkish border that is the site of fighting between Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed forces. Washington denies the reports. The US could be trying to build up a facility it used as a special operations base prior to pulling out in 2019. After the U.S. departed, Russian forces took it over and remained there until exiting following Assad’s ouster.
Incoming President Trump was the one who ordered the US exit from the base in 2019, but despite his calls for a larger withdrawal from Syria, the Pentagon ignored him.
The US of course still maintains that it is in Syria to fight ISIS, which is simultaneously used by the US-Israel and other times used as a boogeyman to explain occupation. The New Orleans attacker carrying an ISIS flag will no doubt complicate any future calls for the US to scale back its purported fight against the group in Syria, as will the fact that Israel is reportedly already urging the incoming Trump team to back the Kurds.
More grounded in reality is Washington and Tel Aviv’s use of the Kurds as leverage over Türkiye. They also fear that Iran could step in to provide support to the Kurdish fighters in the face of Turkish onslaught. That’s a similar fear shared by Ankara, which is wary of Tehran reaching out to Kurdish fighters to destabilize Türkiye during a possible escalation with Israel — a pretty clear sign that at least in Tehran, Türkiye is rightly viewed as part of the US-Israel axis.
In conclusion, Erdogan is currently playing a weak hand.
Without a full-on Turkish invasion, he likely can’t take on Kurds supported by US and Israel with HTS forces increasingly eyeing bigger pay days than Türkiye can offer. And it increasingly looks like Türkiye is getting gradually sidelined.
On the other hand, should Erdogan make peace with the Kurds, all these obstacles can become benefits for Türkiye.
Gulf money pours in, and that could help the Turkish construction industry, which has always been an important backer of Erdogan.
The US could back off on sanctions and unofficial embargoes on defense exports to Türkiye stay off the table. Türkiye continues to ink major deals with NATO countries, and the Turkish build up of its domestic military industry continues.
Oil continues to flow to Israel from Azerbiajan through Türkiye.
And Türkiye could be a big winner (assuming its success) in the NATO-Israel push to further isolate and destabilize Iran with a NATO Turan Corridor which sees the West link up hypothetical client states across Iran’s north. The recent turn of Azerbaijani public opinion against Russia over its alleged role in the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243 on Christmas Day also happens to play into this strategy.
We’ll see. Erdogan’s Türkiye is often full of surprises.
