Russian officials, now including Putin himself, have responded negatively to the US-Ukraine ceasefire proposal, which is hardly a surprise, since Russian officials have been saying “No ceasefire” every time the topic of Ukraine comes up. But they appear to be sending other messages that the Western press is ignoring but Russians and the Global South may pick up on, such as not being on board with the Trump Administration’s theatrics unduly public process.
As we indicated yesterday, senior Kremlin emissary Yuri Ushakov reaffirmed the repeated Russian rejection of a ceasefire except as part of an agreement that addressed the underlying issues of the Ukraine conflict.1 He did that by replaying what he said to US National Security Adviser on a phone call in a short televised interview. Ushakov tried to have it both ways, saying it was up to Putin to respond officially, but it’s clear that Ushakov was not speaking out of school. Less well reported was that Russian Parliament’s Defense Committee Viktor Sobolev also criticized the US-Ukraine scheme as obviously only in Ukraine’s interest.
I took the speed of the Ushakov remarks, made before friend of and pet negotiator for Trump Steve Witkoff had even arrived in Moscow, to among other things, discuss the US-Ukraine scheme with Russian officials, as a diss, even if it might be too subtle to register on thick-headed and inexperienced Trump officials. The first is the obvious, “What about ‘no’ don’t you understand?” It was disrespectful to Russia to serve up a proposal that tried to talk loudly over what the Russian have said about “no cessation of hostilities until critical matters are settled” since the start of the SMO. So they undercut Witkoff on a fair bit of what he might have been planning to do.2
The second layer of Western disrespect to Russia was the attempt to negotiate via press release. The Russians have also made clear their preference for conducting diplomacy along traditional lines: lower level exchanges of feelers, and lower and more senior private discussions, with announcements made only when there is something to announce (as in progress or some event that forces an official “mumble mumble” on status). Colonel Macgregor, in a fresh talk on the Judge Napolitano show, volunteered at the top of his remarks (starting at 2:38) that we were working against our own interest with this approach:
I think the first thing is it’s unfortunate that we continue to discuss our negotiations and interactions with the Russians in public. I don’t see any point to it. And I think as a result we’re going to be embarrassed somewhat by this latest ceasefire offer. If there is anything the Russians have made clear repeatedly, is that a ceasefire in and of itself is not acceptable. They see that as simply buying more time for their Ukrainian opponent to get equipment, cash, whatever, and rebuild themselves and carry on the fight.
This bad habit may have started with the various members of the US/NATO coalition arm-wrestling with each other in public about how much money and what weapons they would have been sending to Ukraine. It’s bizarre to have given the enemy side so much information. But this may have reflected the Western belief that its materiel was so obviously superior that merely saying the wunderwaffen were en route would have Russian soldiers quaking in their boots. Remember the “Be afraid, be very afraid, Leopard are coming” Ukraine propaganda campaign, which has been disappeared from the Innertubes?
Back to the main event. Putin weighed in not long after that, via a response to a question in a Q&A at a press conference. As you can see, he took the proposal at face value, making clear that even if the form was that the US pushed it on Ukraine, it was something Ukraine would find beneficial and could just as easily have demanded of the US. But as we’ll soon explain, there was another layer to this message. From the Kremlin website:
You know, on the face of it, the US-Ukraine meeting in Saudi Arabia may look like the Ukrainian side made this decision under pressure from the United States. In fact, I am absolutely convinced that the Ukrainian side should have asked the Americans for this decision most emphatically, in view of the situation evolving on the ground, as has just been mentioned here.
And what is the current situation on the ground? Many of you have surely noticed that yesterday I visited the Kursk Region and listened to reports from the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of the North group of forces and his deputy on the situation in the border area, first of all in the Kursk Region, or rather, in the incursion zone in the Kursk Region.
What is happening there? The situation there is completely under our control, and the grouping that invaded our territory has been isolated. It is completely isolated and under complete fire control. The control of Ukrainian troops inside this incursion zone has been lost. At the initial stages, just a week or two ago, Ukrainian servicemen tried to get out of there in small groups. Now it is impossible. They are trying to get out in very small groups of two or three men because everything is under our complete fire control.
The military equipment has been completely abandoned and it is impossible to remove it; it will remain there, one hundred percent. If this area is physically blocked in the next few days, then no one will be able to leave. There will only be two options: surrender or die. I think in these conditions it would be good for the Ukrainian side to achieve a ceasefire for at least 30 days. We are also in favour of it, but there are nuances. What are they?
First, what will we do about the incursion section in the Kursk Region? What would that mean if we cease fire for 30 days? Does this mean that everyone who is in there will just walk out without a fight? Do we have to let them go after they committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians? Or will the Ukrainian leadership issue a command for them to lay down their arms and just surrender? How will this happen? It is not clear.
How will other issues along the entire contact line be solved? It is almost 2,000 kilometres long. As you know, Russian troops are advancing in almost all areas of combat contact. Conditions are also very favourable there for us to block rather large units there.
So, how would these 30 days be used? For forced mobilisation to continue in Ukraine? For more weapons to be supplied there? For retraining the mobilised units? Or would none of this be done?
If so, how will issues related to control and verification be addressed? How can we guarantee and receive guarantees that nothing like this would happen? How will control procedures be organised? I hope everyone understands the complexity of all this at the level of common sense. These are all serious issues.
Who will order to cease fire? What is the price of these orders? Just imagine: almost 2,000 km. Who will be able to determine who violated the potential ceasefire agreement over a distance of 2,000 km and where exactly? Who will be held responsible for violating the ceasefire? All these issues must be meticulously worked upon by both sides. The idea itself is right, and, of course, we support it.
However, there are issues that must be discussed. I think we must talk them over with our American colleagues and partners, perhaps have a telephone conversation with President Trump and discuss them with him. However, the idea to put an end to this conflict by peaceful means gets our full support.
TL;DR version: “Well, we can of course talk about this idea, but for this to make any sense for us, many many operational details have to be negotiated and implemented. By the time that got done, we could be in Paris.”
Note also that Putin makes clear no one has yet set up a call with Trump.
If you want to have some yucks, the Institute for the Study of War is in a huff because Russia is not on board with the “intentions and goals” of the US-Ukraine proposal, which is to pull a fast one on Russia.
MORE: Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
Putin’s envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to… https://t.co/gX4s0T3XiT pic.twitter.com/lxWxBmlqU5
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) March 14, 2025
But a bit more seriously, one of Putin’s words had an inference that seems lost on most outside Russia. From Larry Johnson’s e-mail, Regarding a Ceasefire, Putin says it is About “nuance”:
According to Andrei [Martyanov], Putin’s use of the phrase, there are nuances, is a cultural term connected to a crass joke. I asked Perplexity.AI to explain:
A soldier named Garry asks the general for the definition of “nuance.” The general tells him to take down his pants and bend over. The general proceeds to insert himself into the soldier’s anus and then explains that what the soldier feels compared to what the general feels is nuance.
The humor in this joke lies in the subtle wordplay and implied actions. In Russian, the phrase “There is a nuance” (“Есть нюанс”) can also be understood as a command, “Eat a nuance!” when pronounced quickly. The general’s response to Garry’s question about the definition of nuance is to demonstrate it rather than explain it verbally, creating a humorous and somewhat crude situation.
This joke is an example of how Russian humor often relies on wordplay, double entendres, and sometimes crude or sexual innuendos. It’s important to note that understanding such jokes often requires not just knowledge of the Russian language, but also familiarity with Russian cultural context and humor styles.
Got it? Putin was politely telling Trump’s team of negotiators that they could shove the proposed ceasefire deal in Riyadh up their ass. Russia is not going to be bullied or threatened.
A search on Twitter (Putin + nuance) has turned up no tweets making note of Putin’s coded but very pointed dismissal of the US-Ukraine offer.3
This was unlikely to have been one of Putin’s goals, but his choice of a Russian usage will test the Trump Administration in at least two ways: do they even have any Russian specialists left who will get the dirty joke? Remember Scott Ritter has repeatedly inveighed against State Department Russian experts for having over the past 20 years been majors in what he called “Putin hating studies”. Mind you, that fixation does not necessarily mean that they are not otherwise culturally clued in. But Rex Tillerson did a bit of a purge at State under Trump 1.0, and it’s not clear if there is anyone that Russia-savvy on this team.
And even if they were, and someone told Rubio and Waltz what the use of “nuance” implied, would they tell Trump? It’s hard to imagine, with Trump being an obsessively dominant sort, that he would not respond to Putin’s second layer of meaning, even if only by making a joke. So Trump not manifesting knowledge of Putin’s layered message in their next interaction would point to Trump’s team either being very ignorant or choosing to withhold information.
So despite the appearance of things changing, not much has changed. The US is supporting Ukraine even though it cannot change the trajectory of the war. Russia will keep destroying Ukraine’s army until something breaks. My guess is only then (as in conditions at that point) will it settle on its end game.
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1 As our Aurelien points out, that sort of cessation of hostilities is not called a ceasefire in diplo-speak. A ceasefire is understood to be temporary, and the Russians have said that’s not in their interest. The Russians are looking for an armistice.
2 One could be charitable and see the Russians as trying to adapt to American norms. New Yorkers regard it as polite not to waste someone’s time. So perhaps trying to truncate Witkoff’s discussions was a courtesy of sorts.
3 On “How could no one in the West be mentioning this if true?” There were many times when I was working with the Japanese that there were many conditions and news stories in Japan, that ought to have been seen as being of keen commercial interest to US businessmen, that were completely unreported. Admittedly, this sort of coarse jibe seems out of character for Putin, which may be why he made it, to let Russians know the depth of his objection. And it isn’t as if coarse language is never used in diplomatic contexts. Gonzalo Lira reported in one of his YouTubes that “Fuck the EU” Victoria Nuland visited the Kremlin in October 2021. There she told various officials, including IIRC Lavrov, in the most sailor-like Russian, that the US was going to clear the Donbass, and if Russia tried to stop that, the US would respond in a ferocious manner.