The state of play in the Russia-US negotiations after their session early this week in Saudi Arabia failed to get much if any front-page attention. That was thanks to the furor over top US officials accidentally inviting Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeff Goldberg to participate in some Yemen-attack-planning on a Signal chat. The fallout has been revealing, including a Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth self-discrediting rant and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard refusing to answer if the texts were classified and stonewalling on releasing them to the Senate if not.
Back to the main event. Three teams traveled to Riyadh, a very senior Ukraine group, and mid-senior level representatives for the US and Russia. Multiple reports said, consistent with the plan agreed on the Putin-Trump phone call to hold bi-lateral talks, the US spent minimal time spent with the Ukraine delegation, only 40 minutes before the Russia-US discussions and 30 minutes after. That means the communication was one way.
By contrast, the US and Russian discussions took over 12 hours in one day. The two sides emerged, conveying the impression that they’d made progress, but said it was too late in the day for them to provide a joint statement as promised. They’d do it the next day. The White House put out its statement on the US-Russia talks.
No joint statement has been provided. This points to three possible bad developments, which are not mutually exclusive:
1. Russia and the US thought they had agreed an outline of terms for the supposed accomplishment of the pow-wow, that of a maritime ceasefire. But they amazingly found they had misunderstood each other on points key to one side (presumably the Russian side) and could not agree to a statement since there actually was an unresolved outtrade.
Frankly, this looks to have happened with the electricity infrastructure ceasefire. Russia got a readout published in record time. It described the agreement as covering “energy infrastructure”. The US readout instead said the ceasefire covered “energy and infrastructure” which is vastly more comprehensive. Ukraine immediately started complaining about Russia violating the pact. To clear up that loose end on March 25, the Kremlin published A list of energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine covered by the temporary moratorium on strikes against the energy system, as agreed upon by the Russian and American sides.1
As reported by Russian officials (more on that soon) , it was an improved version of the so-called grain deal, in which Russia would allow the passage of commercial vessels through the Black Sea for grain and fertilizer transport, along with a select waivers on sanctions so as to allow select Russian banks to receive payments for these products.
One of the big reasons Russia refused to renew this grain agreement was the failure to honor the financial components of the deal, which were as important as the transport part but just about entirely ignored in the Western press. A second part was Ukraine allegedly getting shipments of arms on commercial vessels, apparently due to Turkiye not doing adequate inspections of ships (a bug or a feature?). Ukraine even once sent drones along a protected shipment corridor, another agreement-breaching act.
So it’s not as if why the earlier deal failed should be a mystery if the US side was prepared….which seems not.
2. Russia and the US did have a deal. But US officials called the mothership in the morning, and were told to renege on certain elements. This is a non-uncommon bad faith trick in negotiating that I call double-brokering2 (there may be a term of art, if so, readers please pipe up).
3. Some sources claim Ukraine nixed the agreed joint text. This seems like a dog-ate-my-homework for some version of #1 or #2 above. But if true, this is yet another bad sign for negotiations. Russia and the US were supposed to truck bi-laterally. The tacit assumption was that the US could leash and collar Ukraine. But the Russian Ministry of Defense has been publicizing Ukraine violations of the energy infrastructure ceasefire. This confirms my thesis, that Ukraine has agency, and even though weak, still has possession of the vast majority of territorial Ukraine. Even though it will eventually be broken if it does not agree to a settlement, it’s clearly not about to do that soon (as in at least the next month or two).
So shorter: if Ukraine really could nix the joint statement, that vitiates the pretense that it is not a party to a settlement. It may be a very subordinate party that has to shut up and sit in the anteroom most of the time. But as of now, a deal can’t be concluded without Ukraine cooperation.
I had initially thought it was very clever for Russia to try to revive the grain deal. First, it’s much simpler to work from existing texts and renegotiate sections than start from scratch. Second, to a significant degree, this pact had been to benefit Africa, as in to get food and fertilizer there; Russia has intended to give it away to countries suffering from food shortages. So at least as of then, the aim was more to elevate Russia’s stature and less about profit (that may not be as true now given harvests and current market conditions). But third and perhaps most important, going over what happened with this grain scheme would allow Russia to give the US chapter, book and verse on Ukraine bad behavior, and enlist them in problem-solving to prevent its recurrence.
But now I wonder if the Americans are just too dumb and lazy. It seems all too possible that the American team arrived in Riyadh, not having even read the text of the earlier grain agreement, and some of what the Russians said went over their heads. It seems hard to fathom how the Russians could have gone into detail on the banking side of the agreement and have the Americans act as if they heard nothing of the kind. From CNN just a few hours ago:
US President Donald Trump said he believes Russia wants to end its war with Ukraine, but suggested Moscow could be “dragging their feet” after the Kremlin disputed accounts of agreements made with the US….
His comments came only hours after Russia said it would only implement a US-brokered deal to stop using force in the Black Sea once some of the sanctions imposed on its banks and exports over its invasion of Ukraine are lifted.
Following days of separate negotiations with Ukrainian and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia, the White House said on Tuesday that the two sides had agreed “to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.”
But while Zelensky confirmed in a news conference that Ukraine had agreed to stop using military force in the Black Sea, the Kremlin released its own statement on the talks, which included far-reaching conditions for signing up to the partial truce.
Those included lifting sanctions on its agricultural bank and other financial institutions and companies involved in exporting food and their re-connection to the SWIFT international payments system.
The US statements made no mention of the sanctions being lifted as a precondition to the ceasefire.
Speaking to reporters on Tuesday afternoon, Trump said his administration was looking at Russia’s conditions. “We’re thinking about all of them right now. There are five or six conditions. We are looking at all of them,” he said.
The White House said that Russia and Ukraine also agreed to implement a previously announced pause on attacks against energy infrastructure.
If we are to take the Trump remarks at face value (always an iffy proposition), this looks like double-brokering: the Russian side was authorized to commit within certain parameters, while the US side was either not authorized to, or had undisclosed limits and went beyond them without informing the Russian side. The White House statement is at the 50,000 foot level and only mentions the US making an effort to remove financial impediments, not actually do so:
The United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.
Given that no less than Putin had made a stink about the failure of the Western side to allow the agricultural bank to be reconnected to SWIFT, it is very hard to imagine that the Russian were unclear in Riyadh about their requirements on this point.
In fact, the Russian version of what was agreed in Riyadh, posted on the Kremlin site, lists the conditions that Trump alludes to. These items are set forth with such specificity as to make it hard to think Russia made them up after the fact. Russia believes it made clear the deal does not come into effect until these items have all been implemented. So the US can want what it wants or believe what it wants to believe all day, but there will be no “maritime ceasefire” otherwise.
However, the Russians must also have known that their requirements could not be delivered by the US. It’s not just a matter of Ukraine opposition. We’ve also said that the seemingly weak Europeans have agency. They made clear they won’t authorize the sanctions relief needed to make the “grain deal,” now the maritime ceasefire, go forward. From the Financial Times:
Brussels has rejected Russia’s demand to lift EU restrictions on a key agricultural bank as part of a partial ceasefire deal, saying its sanctions regime will stay in place until the “unconditional withdrawal” of Moscow’s troops from Ukraine.
In other words, after all the hype about a marine ceasefire, there is none. The US is still thinking about it. And Trump has the temerity to blame Russia for delay.
On top of that, there are reasons to think the US got cute. Recall after the Putin-Trump call, the Kremlin was out double-fast with its readout, at least in part to reassure Russians worried about a Putin sellout to the US. Here, the Russians held back, perhaps because they thought the joint statement would be published. Instead, the US punted on that and got its spin out first.
Now consider an overarching issue: the unseemly US hurry to get a “ceasefire” done, as if that were somehow tantamount to a cessation of hostilities. Russian has sensibly and consistently said no to a ceasefire before the underlying causes of the war are addressed. Putin has been playing faux-amenable to Trump trying to do that out of order by describing in detail how extensive the protections of Russian interests would have to be for a naked ceasefire to be acceptable. As I said earlier, the Russians could be in Paris by the time that all was negotiated and put in place.
In another not-positive sign for how US-Russia relations are going, Russia felt the need to make a forceful statement about Trump trying to take an interest in Russian assets behind Russia’s back. First, from the Washington Post on March 20:
President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed “American ownership” of nuclear power plants in Ukraine in a phone call on Wednesday, the White House said. Zelensky offered a somewhat different account Thursday: He said that only one nuclear power plant had been discussed — the sprawling Zaporizhzhia plant, which is occupied by Russian forces — and that U.S. ownership was not on the table.
Andrei Martyanov provided a translation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ smackdown yesterday:
In connection with the speculations circulated in the media on the possible transfer of the Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP) to Ukraine or the establishment of some kind of “joint control” over the station with Ukraine, the United States or representatives of international organizations, we would like to clarify the following. ZNPP is a Russian nuclear facility. Following the referendums held at the end of September 2022, the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions became part of the Russian Federation as full-fledged subjects. On October 5, 2022, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 711 “On the specifics of legal regulation in the field of atomic energy use in the territory of the Zaporizhzhya region” was signed, securing the status of ZNPP as a facility under Russian jurisdiction. The return of the station to the Russian nuclear industry is a long-standing fact that the international community can only acknowledge.
The transfer of ZNPP itself or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is impossible. All the station’s employees are citizens of the Russian Federation, their lives cannot be played with, especially considering the atrocities that Ukrainians have committed and continue to commit on the territory of our country. Joint operation of the Zaporizhzhya NPP with any state is also unacceptable. There are no such precedents in world practice. In this case, for example, it is impossible to properly ensure nuclear and physical nuclear safety, or regulate issues of civil liability for nuclear damage. An important aspect is that close cooperation between NATO intelligence services with Ukraine, which have impressive sabotage potential, makes it impossible to even temporarily admit representatives of these states to the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
The idea of any international organizations participating in the operation of the station also seems absurd, since neither the mandate nor the competence of any of them allows them to participate in the operation of nuclear facilities. In accordance with international law, including key specialized conventions, the states themselves bear the primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear and physical nuclear safety on their territory. In the case of ZNPP, it is the Russian Federation, and nothing else.
Ouch.
Recall that we had pointed out that the Trump “raw earth” scheme, which later had ports and power plants thrown in, would complicate any settlement, since the US would be laying claims to assets in Russian hands. Putin politely drew a line, saying the US could participate in the development of any mineral deposits (as in provide services on a contract basis), but Russia owned the four oblasts it deems to be part of Russia. Russia has now gone into “What about ‘no’ don’t you understand?” mode.
After being so deluded as to say he could end the war in 24 hours, Trump has fallen back, with his latest target date April 20. That is now clearly na ga happen. In keeping, there is no date for a Trump-Putin summit either.
Trump foolishly ignored the advice of Steve Bannon, which would have been to declare Ukraine to have been Biden’s war, send any remaining authorized cash and arms, and wash his hands of it. The longer this goes on, the more he owns it. He can deal more harshly with Ukraine intransigence by cutting off intel (a penalty box of a week, with longer suspensions for successive infractions?). Yet despite Trump having the fun of beating Zelensky up in the Oval Office, he has still not been brought to heel.
So what is the reason for the urgency about a “deal” with Russia, when Trump could put the US participation in Project Ukraine out of its misery in very short order? Some like Alexander Mercouris contend that it’s because he intuits Ukraine will collapse soon. Trump would lose any smidge of leverage and also have left himself open to accusations of “losing” Ukraine. If he had followed the Bannon plan, he would have greatly reduced that attack surface.
My guess is the urgency has to do with Iran. Larry Wilkerson, in a new interview with Nima of Dialogue Works, argued that (54:45) that the US is prodding Israel to keep up aggression in Syria despite already being over extended. Both Wilkerson in this clip and Chas Freeman in a new Judge Napolitano talk said that if the Israel were to attack Iran, which would clearly have to have US backing, that Russia would support Iran. From Judge Napolitano at 20:50:
Napolitano: Would an American military support of an Israeli attack on Tehran impair American-Russian relationships?
Freeman It would affect them very negatively because it would appear to demonstrate that we are prepared to bully and use force as a substitute for diplomacy, and that would discredit the diplomacy….I think this would really bring that to a point of no return.
Recall that the US has been laboring under the delusion that Russia would help the US when it is still supporting Ukraine. Bloomberg ran a bizarre article in early March that depicted Russia as willing to “do everything in its power”
Recall that Trump then said he sent a letter to the Supreme Leader, which oddly took a very long time to arrive and was rejected forcefully. For Trump to send a letter means both a lack of mediation and haste from the US side. From a Reuters report about a week after the Bloomberg story ran:
The Kremlin, asked on Monday if Russia had held consultations with Iran before or after Tehran responded to a letter from U.S. President Donald Trump urging the country to negotiate a nuclear deal, said Iran formulates its own policy positions.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Saturday that Tehran would not be bullied into negotiations, a day after Trump said he had sent a letter urging Iran to engage in talks on a new nuclear deal.
Before the US resumed its attacks on the Houthis, Marco Rubio called Lavrov and depicted Russia as having “consented”. Lavrov cleared his throat and disputed that characterization, making it clear Lavrov told Rubio the US should negotiate and not use force (I imagine Russia Foreign Ministry also had to make lots of calls to the strong Palestine supporters among its allies to reassure them that no way, no how did Russia support shelling Yemen).
Rumor has it that Trump demanded Iran Do Something in two months. Iran is clearly not going to Do Anything. Many many geopolitical commentators believe that the US is serious about wanting to commence a war against Iran in the near future.
But perhaps not. One way this war might not happen soon, which could mean “not at all”, is the Russia negotiations dragging out, which is certain. Russia will not be rushed and will need the US to demonstrate it can leash and collar Ukraine on key issues. It can’t do that ex a regime change, and it can’t displace the Banderites (they’d find that harder than the Russians would) even if it gets rid of Zelensky.
So a good guess for the rush to get a resolution in Ukraine is the barmy US assumption is that if that deal is done, Russia will be so happy with its better status with the US that it won’t back Iran.
I suspect many readers share my view that that belief is all wet.
But if the Trumpies believe that, it will stay their hand until a deal over Ukraine is done and dusted before they take on Iran.
One can only hope…
_____
1 It is not clear if this is merely clarification of what was agreed in on the Trump-Putin call, or the publication of disambiguation that took place in the Riyadh talks at the start of this week.
2Savvy negotiators NEVER let a principal negotiate with a broker. The reason is that anything the principal agrees to can be treated as a commitment, while anything the broker agrees to is subject to the assent of his principal. So a smart broker will accept the principal’s position as a starting point and try to ratchet further from that, based on some additional concern his principal has. A less obvious version of that may have been operative here, that Russian side likely had permission to deal within certain set parameters, while the US side did not or otherwise had much more limited authority, and whether out of bad faith or cavalierness, exceeded it.